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Abstract 
This paper examines the causes of MNCs’ divestments in China. The MNCs’ profitability, market shares 
and productivities are negatively related to the possibility of divestment, while the MNCs’ debts are 
positively related to the possibility that foreign investments are divested. These results suggest that 
divestments are affected by MNCs’ performances, and their performances are endogenous shocks for 
divestment. 
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1. Introduction 
With the process of liberalization and the opening of market, multinational companies (MNCs) have 
become an important role in China economy. However, MNCs have begun to exit from China in recent 
years. 16410 MNCs had exited from China market as the end of 2009, 24124 MNCs had exited from 
China market as the end of 2011, while 30803 MNCs had exited from China as the end of 2013. 
Previous studies show that many workers would lose their jobs and local economic growth would 
become lower when MNCs exit from the host country (Li, 2008; He, 2012). It is important to analyze 
the causes of MNCs divestments in China under the globalized environment.  
 
Table 1. Number of MNCs Exist 
Year Number of MNCs invest Number of MNCs exist Mount of MNC exist (million dollar) 
2009 27406 16410 31800 
2010 22773 17420 21700 
2011 23435 24124 34100 
2012 27712 26469 31100 
2013 24925 30803 53200 
 
Numerous previous studies have examined the causes of MNCs’ divestments (Boddewyn, 1983; 
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Ghemanwat & Nalebuff, 1990; Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Dunning, 2000). If a company has 
firm-specific advantages that generate excess profits, it will have an incentive to enter foreign markets 
and transfer the advantages to foreign subsidiaries. In contrast, companies will exit from a foreign 
market if they face financial difficulties in their home country that damage their firm-specific 
advantages (Dunning, 2000). MNCs that performed poorly in their home country tend to exit from their 
home country and increase investment in the host country (Buerry, 2009). Chen and Wu (1996) find 
that capital-intensive firms tend to exit from Taiwan within a shorter period of time than the 
labor-intensive ones from 1950s to 1990s. A host market’s demand has a significant impact on 
divestment, MNCs that suffered from deteriorating demand are likely to exit from the country, and it 
shows that smaller firms will be the last to exit when faced with declining demand (Ghemanwat & 
Nalebuff, 1990). 
Previous studies have examined the causes of MNCs’ divestments from the perspective of home 
country or host country. These facts suggest MNCs are vulnerable to exogenous shocks that occur in 
the home country or host country. However, these studies do not analyze the causes of subsidiaries’ 
divestments from the perspective of their performance. We use subsidiaries’ profitability, debts, market 
shares and productivities to represent their performance. We could get the relationships between the 
possibility of divestments and subsidiaries’ performances by examining the logit model used in this 
paper. The main result of this paper is summarized as follows: the possibility of divestments would 
decrease when subsidiaries’ profitability, markets shares and productivities increase; the possibility of 
divestments would increase when subsidiaries’ debts increase. It suggests that subsidiaries’ 
performances are the important causes of subsidiaries’ divestments, and subsidiaries’ performances are 
endogenous shocks for divestment. 
The remainder of this article is as follows: the second section of this article presents the main 
hypotheses of divestment. The third second of this article shows our data and our empirical 
methodology. The fourth section of this article displays our empirical results. A brief summary is 
presented in the conclusion. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
The main purpose of MNCs’ operational activities in the host country is to make profits. Several studies 
have argued that the profitability will influence firms’ divestments. Levinthal and Wu (2009) suggest 
that firms will seek new product markets when faced with low-value contexts. The MNCs may increase 
their investments in the host country when they face with huge profits. Conversely, MNCs would sell 
assets in their less-profitable divisions. Further subsidiaries may exit from the host country when their 
profits decrease (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001). 
Hypothesis 1. The higher total profits of the subsidiaries have, the lower is the possibility of divestment 
in the host country. 
Previous studies have noted the significance of conditions to the amount of debt financing by firms 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp               Journal of Business Theory and Practice                  Vol. 3, No. 1, 2015 
83 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
(Harris & Raviv, 1991; Jensen, 1993). In Myers’ (1977) analysis, debt decreases investment because of 
“debt overhang”. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) point out that increases in debt are associated with a 
reduction in investment and an increase in the incidence of plant closings. 
Hypothesis 2. The higher debts of the subsidiaries have, the higher is the possibility of divestment in 
the host country. 
The subsidiaries’ sales could represent the market share of their products. The higher are the sales of 
subsidiaries, the higher is the market share of their products, the more obvious are their monopoly 
advantages in the host country, and the lower is the possibility of divestment in the host country. 
Hypothesis 3. The higher sales of the subsidiaries have, the lower is the possibility of divestment in the 
host country. 
Fixed capital is that portion of the total capital outlay that is invested in fixed assets (such as land, 
buildings, vehicles, plant and equipment). On the one hand, subsidiaries possess more fixed capitals, 
they own more plants and machineries, and they could produce more products. On the other hand, the 
fixed capital represents a firm’s sunk cost, more fixed capital represents more sunk cost, and it also 
means that more pre-investment these subsidiaries have paid. Therefore, the more fixed capitals 
subsidiaries possess, the lower is the possibility of divestment in host country. 
Hypothesis 4. The more fixed capitals of the subsidiaries have, the lower is the possibility of 
divestment in the host country. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
This paper has collected data from Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database including statistics of the 
firms in China from 1997-2008. Because of the serious missing data of the year in 2007 and 2008, and 
the missing data does not meet the requirements of logit model, we uses the data of divest subsidiaries 
in 2006. 
To further analyze the causes of subsidiaries’ divestments, we conduct logit regression analyses that 
adopt a dummy variable (Divestment) as a dependent variable which takes a value of one for divested 
subsidiaries and zero for non-divested ones. The independent variables are subsidiaries’ profitability 
(ROA), subsidiaries’ debts (Debt), subsidiaries’ sales (Sale) and subsidiaries’ fixed capitals (Fix capi). 
Subsidiaries’ profitability is measured using return on average assets (ROA), which is calculated as total 
profit divided by total assets. Subsidiaries’ debts (Debt) are calculated using the sum of long-term debt 
and short debt divided by total assets (Kovenock & Phillips, 1997). Subsidiaries’ sales (Sale) are 
calculated using sales divided by total assets. Subsidiaries’ fixed capitals (Fix_capi) are calculated 
using fixed capitals divided by totals assets. The control variables: period is calculated using 
divestment year minus the established year represents subsidiaries’ localization capabilities, 
subsidiaries’ total assets (T_asset) represents subsidiaries’ size. Model 1 represents the relationship 
between ROA and Divestment. Model 2 represents the relationship between Debt and Divestment. 
Model 3 represents the relationship between Sale and Divestment. Model 4 represents the relationship 
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between Fix_capi and Divestment.  is an error term. 
Divestment= + lnROA+ lnPeriod+ lnT_asset+                                  (1) 
Divestment= + lnDebt+ lnPeriod+ lnT_asset+                                 (2) 
Divestment= + lnSale+ lnPeriod+ lnT_asset+                                  (3) 
Divestment= + lnFix_capi+ lnPeriod+ lnT_asset+                              (4) 
 
4. Results and Analyses 
Table 1 shows the statistics of variables. Because we take a value of one for divested subsidiaries and 
zero for non-divested ones, the average of Divestment indicates 12.5% subsidiaries exited from China 
in 2006. The exit rate in 2006 is a little lower than that in 2005. But it is still in a relatively high level. 
We will analyze the causes of divestment from subsidiaries’ performances. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Divestment 28721 0.1245778 0.3302454 0 1 
LnROA 22146 7.6995 2.037826 1.64997 15.7742 
LnDebt 28638 9.620847 1.750329 0.3540943 17.11524 
LnSale 28709 10.74138 1.439942 0.4064675 18.87176 
LnFix_capi 28701 9.094508 1.803424 0.6931472 16.64646 
LnPeriod 28721 1.96169 0.5758949 0.0111681 4.672829 
LnT_asset 28721 10.50873 1.49084 0.7670044 17.49813 
 
Table 3. Correlations 
Divestment ROA Debt Sale Fix_capi Period T_asset 
Divestment 1.0000 
ROA 0.0081 1.0000 
Debt 0.045 -0.0418 1.0000 
Sale -0.0007 0.1855 -0.0077 1.0000 
Fix_capi -0.0154 -0.0089 -0.1242 0.0106 1.0000 
Period -0.0339 -0.0109 0.0002 -0.0629 -0.0653 1.0000 
T_asset -0.0355 -0.001 0.0244 -0.0275 0.0448 0.0751 1.0000 
 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp               Journal of Business Theory and Practice                  Vol. 3, No. 1, 2015 
85 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Column 1 in Table 4 shows that subsidiaries’ ROA has a significant and negative impact on the 
possibility of divestment. The result suggests that the possibility of divestment would decrease when 
subsidiaries’ ROA increases. It is likely that FDI’s main purpose is to make profits in host markets, 
subsidiaries’ managers are more likely to invest when the subsidiaries have huge profits. In contrast, 
subsidiaries are more likely to exit when they are in an unprofitable market. Buerry’s (2009) paper 
shows similar conclusion. This result of column 1 supports our hypothesis 1.  
Column 2 in Table 4 shows that subsidiaries’ debts (Debt) have a significant and positive impact on the 
possibility of divestment. The result suggests that subsidiaries are more likely to exit from host country 
when they are facing with increased debts. Increased debt will worsen subsidiaries’ capital structure, 
and higher the possibility of divestment. Myers (1977), Kovenock and Phillips (1997) show the similar 
conclusions. Our result in column 2 supports our hypothesis 2. 
Column 3 in Table 4 shows that subsidiaries’ sales (Sale) have a significant and negative impact on 
possibility of divestment. The result suggests that the possibility of divestment would decrease when 
subsidiaries face with increased sales. It is likely that subsidiaries’ sales could represent the market 
share of their products, the higher are the sales of subsidiaries, the higher is the market share of their 
products, the more obvious of their monopoly advantages in the host country, the lower possibility of 
divestment in the host country.  
Column 4 in Table 4 shows that subsidiaries’ fixed capitals (Fix_capi) have a significant and negative 
impact on the possibility of divestment. The result suggests that the possibility of divestment would 
decrease when subsidiaries face with increased fixed capitals. It is likely that subsidiaries’ increased 
fixed capitals mean they spend more money to buy plants and machineries, which will enhance their 
productivity, and increase their sunk cost. The increased productivity and sunk cost will reduce the 
possibility of divestment. The result of column 4 supports our hypothesis 4. 
Each column in Table 4 shows that subsidiaries’ operating periods (Period) have a significant and 
negative impact on possibility of divestment. The result suggests that the subsidiaries that have longer 
operating periods are less likely to exit from host country. It is likely that subsidiaries with longer 
operating periods have stronger abilities to resolve disputes with local government. The longer 
operating periods could reduce the possibility of divestment. 
Each column in Table 4 shows that subsidiaries’ total assets (T_asset) have a significant and negative 
impact on possibility of divestment. It suggests that the possibility of divestment would decrease when 
subsidiaries’ total assets increase. It is likely that the total assets represent subsidiaries’ technology 
skills and assets power, larger subsidiaries have stronger assets power and more advanced technology 
skills, they could rely on their stronger assets power to lower procurement costs when they negotiate 
with suppliers. Subsidiaries that have stronger assets power are less likely to exit. Agarwal and 
Ramaswami (1991) find the similar conclusion. 
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Table 4. Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Divestment Divestment Divestment Divestment Divestment 
Year 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 
LnROA -0.109*** -0.030* 
 (-7.61) (-1.81) 
LnDebt 0.077*** 0.089*** 
 (3.50) (3.11) 
LnSale -0.507*** -0.362*** 
 (-22.79) (-10.68) 
LnFix_capi -0.093*** -0.065*** 
 (-4.84) (-2.69) 
LnPeriod -0.282*** -0.284*** -0.320*** -0.295*** -0.291*** 
 (-7.23) (-9.06) (-10.21) (-9.40) (-7.40) 
LnT_asset -0.281*** -0.279*** -0.420*** -0.269*** -0.368*** 
 (-16.84) (-20.56) (-26.40) (-19.75) (-18.98) 
_Cons 0.986*** 1.534*** 3.058*** 1.237*** 2.238*** 
 (5.62) (10.62) (18.22) (8.45) (9.71) 
Pseudo R2 0.0296 0.0286 0.0524 0.0287 0.0377 
Log likelihood -7257.9401 -10453.416 -10224.212 -10460.099 -7162.987 
N 22146 28638 28709 28701 22074 
Note. *** Significant at the 1% level;  
** Significant at 5% level;  
* Significant at 10% level. 
 
We also run an additional set of robustness tests of our main findings in which we specify alternative 
dependent variables in 1998. The independent variables: we use total profits (T_prof) represents 
subsidiaries’ profitability, debts (Debt) which is equal to the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt, 
sales (Sale) represents subsidiaries’ market share and fixed capitals (Fix_capi) represents subsidiaries’ 
productivities. The control variables are subsidiaries’ operating periods (Period) and subsidiaries’ total 
assets (T_asset). 
Results in Table 5 show that T_prof, Sale and Fix_capi have a significant and negative impact on the 
divestment probability, Debt has a significant and positive impact on the possibility of divestment. Our 
results in Table 5 suggest that the main motivations for divestment are likely to be low total profits, low 
sales, low fixed capitals and huge debts of subsidiaries. The robustness checks in Table 3 are consistent 
with all results in Table 4. 
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Table 5. Robustness Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Divestment Divestment Divestment Divestment Divestment 
Year 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
LnROA -0.123*** -0.021 
 (-3.73) (-0.57) 
LnDebt 0.635*** 0.796*** 
 (8.86) (7.44) 
LnSale -0.191*** -0.232*** 
 (-3.76) (-2.67) 
LnFix_capi -0.221*** 0.067 
 (-3.08) (0.65) 
LnPeriod -1.492*** -1.542*** -1.482*** -1.536*** -1.489*** 
 (-14.49) (-19.35) (-18.66) (-19.12) (-14.39) 
LnT_asset 0.001 -0.859*** -0.020 0.012 -0.798*** 
 (0.02) (-10.28) (-0.33) (0.15) (-4.18) 
_Cons 4.896*** 6.954*** 6.123*** 6.121*** 6.665*** 
 (8.04) (14.44) (13.22) (13.25) (9.70) 
Pseudo R2 0.1533 0.1775 0.1593 0.1575 0.1796 
Log likelihood -974.62638 -1583.0605 -1618.9806 -1620.9357 -942.17793 
N 1703 2824 2826 2823 1698 
Note. *** Significant at the 1% level;  
** Significant at 5% level;  
* Significant at 10% level. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Subsidiaries are likely to play a key role in Chinese market by improving the speed of China economy, 
they would provide jobs and stimulate local economy (Li, 2008; He, 2012). However, subsidiaries have 
begun to exit from China market in recent years. Previous studies analyze the causes of MNCs’ 
divestments from the perspective of home country or host country (Dunning, 2000; Chemanwat & 
Nalebuff, 1990; Chen & Wu, 1996; Buerry, 2009). These facts suggest that MNCs are vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks that occur in the home country or host country. This paper has analyzed the causes of 
divestments from the perspective of subsidiaries’ performance. Our main results are summarized as 
follows. The subsidiaries’ profitability, market shares and productivities are negatively related to the 
likelihood of divestment, the subsidiaries’ debts are positively related to the likelihood that foreign 
investments are divested. This paper suggests that subsidiaries’ poor performances give them an 
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incentive to exit from host country. But this paper does not mention how to improve subsidiaries’ 
performances. 
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Notes 
Note 1. The data is from China Bureau of Statistics and China Foreign Exchange Administration. 
Note 2. If a subsidiary’s code of representative can be found in 2005, but does not exist in 2006, it 
means the subsidiary has divested from China in 2006. 
 
